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O P I N I O N 
___________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal requires us to determine whether Wilson 
Emilio Peguero Mateo’s conspiracy plea for Robbery of a 
Motor Vehicle under Pennsylvania law qualifies as a “crime of 
violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), as incorporated into 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (“INA”).  In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), and our 
decision in Baptiste v. Attorney General, 841 F.3d 601, 621 (3d 
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Cir. 2016), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Feb. 6, 2017) (No. 16-
978), we hold that § 16(b), as incorporated into the INA, is 
unconstitutionally vague.  We will therefore grant the Petition 
for Review, vacate the order of removal, and remand for further 
proceedings.   
I.  
 Mateo is a twenty-one-year-old native and citizen of the 
Dominican Republic who was admitted to the United States on 
August 11, 2010 as a lawful permanent resident.  On June 17, 
2013, he pleaded guilty to the felony charge of criminal 
conspiracy pursuant to 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 903.  The 
underlying offense for his conspiracy plea was Robbery of a 
Motor Vehicle under Pennsylvania law, which dictates that 
“[a] person commits a felony of the first degree if he steals or 
takes a motor vehicle from another person in the presence of 
that person or any other person in lawful possession of the 
motor vehicle.”  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3702.  On December 3, 
2013, Mateo was convicted and sentenced to eleven to twenty-
three months’ confinement, and thirty-six months’ probation.  
 On January 16, 2014, the United States Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”) served Mateo with a Notice to 
Appear, charging Mateo as removable as an alien convicted of 
an aggravated felony pursuant to § 237(a)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A).  Specifically, DHS stated that Mateo 
was subject to removal because his Robbery of a Motor 
Vehicle conviction constituted an aggravated felony under 
INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and was 
a “crime of violence” as defined in INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 
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U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).1  To define a “crime of violence,” the 
INA incorporates 18 U.S.C. § 16, which defines the phrase as 
follows: 
 The term “crime of violence” 
means-- 
(a) an offense that has as an 
element the use, attempted 
use, or threatened use of 
physical force against the 
person or property of 
another, or 
(b) any other offense that is a 
felony and that, by its 
nature, involves a 
substantial risk that 
physical force against the 
person or property of 
another may be used in the 
                                              
1  Though not relevant to this case, the DHS also 
charged that Mateo was removable as an alien convicted of a 
crime involving moral turpitude pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(A). Specifically, the DHS stated that Mateo was 
subject to removal because his conviction also constituted a 
crime involving moral turpitude, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(A)(i), because it was  a crime of theft, as defined in 
8 US.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G); and a crime of attempt or conspiracy 
to commit an aggravated felony, as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(43)(U).     
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course of committing the 
offense. 
 Mateo filed a Motion to Terminate Proceedings, 
challenging his removability on the ground that Robbery of a 
Motor Vehicle is not an aggravated felony because it is not a 
crime of violence as defined in § 16(b).  The Immigration 
Judge (“IJ”) disagreed, finding that Robbery of a Motor 
Vehicle is a crime of violence, and sustained the charge of 
removability based on Mateo’s conspiracy conviction.2   
 Mateo appealed the IJ’s decision to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).  The BIA adopted and affirmed 
the IJ’s decision with regard to Mateo’s removability as an 
alien convicted of conspiracy to commit an aggravated felony 
that was deemed a crime of violence.  The BIA did not address 
the remaining aspects of the IJ’s decision and Mateo’s appeal 
was dismissed.  This Petition for Review ensued. 
 On appeal before this Court, Mateo initially argued that 
the BIA improperly determined, as a matter of law, that 
Robbery of a Motor Vehicle is a “crime of violence” under § 
16(b), as incorporated into the INA.  Accordingly, he requested 
that, per this Court’s opinion in Aguilar v. Attorney General of 
the United States, 663 F.3d 692 (3d Cir. 2011), we find that the 
Robbery of a Motor Vehicle statute is “overly broad” and that, 
using the categorical approach, his conviction under the statute 
                                              
2 The IJ dismissed the other charges with respect to 
crimes of theft because Mateo was only convicted of a 
conspiracy to commit Robbery of a Motor Vehicle; not the 
underlying offense itself.  The IJ did not address the charge 
based on a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude.  
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was not a crime of violence under the INA.  The case was 
initially submitted on the briefs without argument.  
 Just before the case was submitted, however, the 
Government filed a letter pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 28(j) informing the Court that the Ninth Circuit, in 
Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110 (2015), held that § 16(b), as 
incorporated into the INA, is unconstitutionally vague in light 
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, 
135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).  Mateo then sent his own Rule 28(j) 
letter, arguing we should also find that § 16(b), as incorporated 
into the INA, is unconstitutionally vague.  Thereafter, we 
ordered supplemental briefing and oral argument addressing 
whether the vagueness standard should be applied in the 
immigration context and, if so, whether § 16(b), as 
incorporated into the INA, is unconstitutionally vague given 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson. 
 Pending in our own Court at the time we heard oral 
argument in this matter was a petition for review in another 
deportation case, Baptiste v. Attorney General, No. 14-4476, 
which also presented the question of whether the definition of 
“crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is void for vagueness.  
We deferred reaching a decision in this matter pending a ruling 
in Baptiste.  Separately, on September 29, 2016, certiorari was 
granted in Dimaya.3  In light of this development, we opted to 
hold this matter C.A.V.4   
                                              
3 Cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 31 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2016). 
4 C.A.V. is the abbreviation for the Latin legal phrase, 
curia advisari vult, meaning “the court will be advised, will 
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Dimaya was argued before the Supreme Court on 
January 17, 2017, and a ruling was expected by the end of June, 
2017.  Then, on June 26, 2017, the Court ordered that Dimaya 
be re-argued during the Court’s October 2017 term.  Given the 
further delay and the fact that this proceeding has been pending 
for a considerable period of time, we have chosen to decide 
Mateo’s petition for review.  In doing so, we must now follow 
our precedential holding in Baptiste, which on November 8, 
2016, held that 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague 
when applied in a removal proceeding.5  841 F.3d 601, 621 (3d 
Cir. 2016).   
II.  
  The IJ had jurisdiction over Mateo’s removal 
proceeding pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.  The BIA had 
jurisdiction to consider Mateo’s appeal pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.1(b)(3).  Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), we have 
jurisdiction to consider “‘questions of law raised upon a 
                                              
consider, will deliberate.”  In re Mystic Tank Lines Corp., 544 
F.3d 524, 526 n.1 (3d Cir. 2008).  It is the term we use when 
we hold an appeal in abeyance pending the outcome of another 
proceeding. 
5 Baptiste was not held C.A.V. pending the Court’s 
ruling in Dimaya because the petitioner had also been found 
removable for having committed a crime involving moral 
turpitude, and thus was removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).  While the petitioner in Baptiste prevailed 
on the crime of violence issue, he ultimately lost on the crime 
involving moral turpitude issue and his petition for review was 
denied.  841 F.3d at 623. 
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petition for review,’ including petitions for review of removal 
orders based on aggravated felony convictions.”  Tran v. 
Gonzales, 414 F.3d 464, 467 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(D)).  “Since the interpretation of criminal 
provisions ‘is a task outside the BIA’s special competence and 
congressional delegation . . . [and] very much a part of this 
Court’s competence,’ our review is de novo.”  Aguilar, 663 
F.3d at 695 (quoting Tran, 414 F.3d at 467).  
III.  
 This appeal turns on the two questions we posed to the 
parties for supplemental briefing: (1) whether the 
constitutional vagueness standard should be applied in the 
civil/immigration context and, if so, (2) whether § 16(b), as 
incorporated into the INA, is unconstitutionally vague given 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson.  The second question 
has been answered in the affirmative by Baptiste, and we are 
bound by that holding.6  We now answer the first question in 
the affirmative as well.  
A.  
 The Supreme Court has explained that the “‘void for 
vagueness’ doctrine [is] applicable to civil as well as criminal 
                                              
6 Third Circuit Internal Operating Procedure 9.1 states 
that the holding of a panel in a precedential opinion is binding 
on subsequent panels.  Court en banc consideration is required 
to overrule such a holding.  See United States v. Brownlee, 454 
F.3d 131, 149 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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actions.”  Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967) (citation 
omitted).  In San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, this Court noted that 
“[l]esser degrees of specificity are required to overcome a 
vagueness challenge in the civil context than in the criminal 
context . . . because the consequences in the criminal context 
are more severe.”  961 F.2d 1125, 1135 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing 
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 
455 U.S. 489, 498–99 (1982)).  Because the consequences of 
deportation are likewise severe, we take this opportunity to 
clarify that the vagueness doctrine should be applied in the civil 
immigration context just as it is applied in the criminal context, 
and that lesser degrees of specificity are not sufficient to 
overcome a vagueness challenge. 
 Indeed, the Supreme Court invoked the vagueness 
doctrine in the immigration context in Jordan v. De George 
precisely because of the severity of deportation.  341 U.S. 223, 
231 (1951) (“Despite the fact that this is not a criminal statute, 
we shall nevertheless examine the application of the vagueness 
doctrine to this case.  We do this in view of the grave nature of 
deportation.”).  After the Supreme Court’s decision in Jordan, 
the Court has since made it clear that “[i]t is well established 
that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law 
in deportation proceedings.”  Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 
(1993) (citing Kaoru Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100–01 
(1903)).  And as Justice Thomas explained in Johnson, the 
Supreme Court has “become accustomed to using the Due 
Process Clauses to invalidate laws on the ground of 
‘vagueness,’” as the doctrine “is quite sweeping” where a 
statute “‘authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement.’”  135 S. Ct. at 2566 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in judgment) (quoting Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 
703, 732 (2000)). 
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 Moreover, it is “‘difficult’ to divorce the penalty from 
the conviction in the deportation context.”  Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010) (citations omitted).  
Accordingly, we hold that the vagueness doctrine may be used 
in the immigration context to challenge the INA’s definition of 
a crime of violence.  Cf. Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1112–13; Shuti 
v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 440, 445 (6th Cir. 2016) (“The criminal 
versus civil distinction is . . . ‘ill suited’ to evaluating a 
vagueness challenge regarding the ‘specific risk of 
deportation.’” (citing Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365–66)). 
 The Government nonetheless maintains that the 
vagueness doctrine should not be applied in the immigration 
context.  Specifically, even though the Supreme Court invoked 
the vagueness doctrine in the immigration context in Jordan, 
the Government contends that the Supreme Court “did not 
squarely decide the extent to which the vagueness doctrine 
applies to the immigration laws.”  United States’ Suppl. Letter 
Br. at 1 n.2.  To make this point, the Government notes that 
other Supreme Court cases after Jordan have declined to 
extend Fifth Amendment limitations in some immigration 
contexts.  See id. (citing Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530–
31 (1954); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588–91 
(1952); Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 314 (1955)).  The 
Government’s concerns with respect to the application of the 
vagueness doctrine in the context of the deportation sanction, 
however, are misguided. 
 The Government’s concerns fail to account for the 
central tenet of the vagueness doctrine: in this case, affording 
aliens “fair notice” of the possibility of removal to ensure the 
“even-handed administration of the law.”  Papachristou v. City 
of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972).  After all, the 
Supreme Court has explained that “accurate legal advice for 
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noncitizens accused of crimes has never been more important” 
because, “as a matter of federal law, deportation is an integral 
part—indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the 
penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who 
plead guilty to specified crimes.”  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 364 
(footnote omitted).  And even more recently, the Court has 
further stressed the need for “efficiency, fairness, and 
predictability in the administration of immigration law” in 
order to “enable[] aliens ‘to anticipate the immigration 
consequences of guilty pleas in criminal court,’ and to enter 
‘safe harbor’ guilty pleas [that] do not expose the [alien 
defendant] to the risk of immigration sanctions.”  Mellouli v. 
Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1987 (2015) (citations omitted).   
 Any semblance of predictability and fairness would be 
frustrated if we were to find that the crime of violence language 
in § 16(b) is subject to vagueness challenges outside of the 
immigration context, yet the same language is not subject to 
vagueness challenges when incorporated into an immigration 
statute.  Cf. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) 
(explaining that it “is well established that the Fifth 
Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation 
proceedings”) (internal quotation marks omitted); A.B. Small 
Co. v. Am. Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233, 239 (1925) (“The 
ground or principle of the [vagueness] decisions was not such 
as to be applicable only to criminal prosecutions.”).   
Accordingly, for the sake of predictability and fairness, we find 
that aliens should get fair notice of the possibility of removal 
based upon a conviction that the Government contends is for a 
crime of violence.  
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B.  
 Because we find that the vagueness doctrine may be 
used in the immigration context to challenge the INA’s 
definition of a crime of violence, we must now determine 
whether § 16(b) is “so vague that it fails to give ordinary people 
fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it 
invites arbitrary enforcement.”  Johnson, 135 S. Ct. 2556 
(citation omitted).  As noted above, we are bound by our 
precedential decision in Baptiste, which held that § 16(b) as 
applied in the immigration context is unconstitutionally vague 
and therefore invalid in light of Johnson.  841 F.3d at 615–21.  
1. 
In Johnson, the Supreme Court examined whether the 
residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) 
was unconstitutionally vague.  Where certain defendants have 
three or more prior convictions for a “violent felony,” the 
ACCA provides a sentence enhancement.  Johnson, 135 S. Ct. 
at 2555.  “Violent felony” is defined as a crime that is 
“burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or 
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential 
risk of physical injury.”  18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).  The 
portion pertaining to a crime that “otherwise involves conduct 
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury” is 
known as the residual clause.   
Prior to Johnson, the ACCA required courts to use the 
categorical approach when deciding whether an offense fell 
within the residual clause.  “Under the categorical approach, a 
court assesses whether a crime qualifies as a violent felony ‘in 
terms of how the law defines the offense and not in terms of 
how an individual offender might have committed it on a 
13 
 
particular occasion.’”  Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557 (quoting 
Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 141 (2008)).  Thus, 
determining “whether the residual clause covers a crime [] 
require[d] a court to picture the kind of conduct that the crime 
involves in ‘the ordinary case,’ and to judge whether that 
abstraction presents a serious potential risk of physical injury.”  
Id. (quoting James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 194 (2007)).   
The Supreme Court found that “[t]wo features of the 
residual clause conspire to make it unconstitutionally vague”:  
the ordinary case inquiry and the serious potential risk inquiry.  
Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557–58; Baptiste, 841 F.3d at 616.  The 
ordinary case inquiry, explained above, raised “grave 
uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by a crime.”  
Id. at 2557.  Application of the categorical approach required 
the courts to conceptualize what the ordinary case of a crime 
might look like—which might involve many varying 
iterations—and the “residual clause offers no reliable way to 
choose between these competing accounts of what an 
‘ordinary’ [crime] involves.”  Id. at 2558.  The serious potential 
risk inquiry was also troublesome because “the residual clause 
leaves uncertainty about how much risk it takes for a crime to 
qualify as a violent felony.”  Id.  The Court concluded that 
“[b]y combining indeterminacy about how to measure the risk 
posed by a crime with indeterminacy about how much risk it 
takes for the crime to qualify as a violent felony, the residual 
clause produces more unpredictability and arbitrariness than 
the Due Process Clause tolerates.”  Id. 
2. 
The petitioner in Baptiste, like Mateo, faced removal on 
the basis of his purported status as an alien convicted of a crime 
of violence under § 16(b).  As stated previously, § 16(b) 
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defines a crime of violence as “any other offense that is a 
felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that 
physical force against the person or property of another may be 
used in the course of committing the offense.”  In order to 
determine whether the crime of conviction is a crime of 
violence under § 16(b), courts utilize the same categorical 
approach that was applied to the ACCA’s residual clause.  
Baptiste, 841 F.3d at 617.   
The petitioner in Baptiste argued that the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Johnson striking down the residual clause 
should apply to negate § 16(b).  After comparing the features 
of the § 16(b) analysis to those found to contribute to the 
unconstitutionality of the residual clause in Johnson, we agreed 
that the same defects were present in § 16(b), rendering the 
provision unconstitutional.  Regarding the first feature, we 
recognized that the same “ordinary case inquiry” is used when 
applying the categorical approach in both contexts.  Id.   Like 
the residual clause, § 16(b) “offers no reliable way to choose 
between . . . competing accounts of what” that “judge-
imagined abstraction” of the crime involves.  Johnson, 135 
S.Ct. at 2558.  Thus, we concluded in Baptiste that “the 
ordinary case inquiry is as indeterminate in the § 16(b) context 
as it was in the residual clause context.”  841 F.3d at 617.  
Turning to the second feature—the risk inquiry—we observed 
that despite slight linguistic differences between the 
provisions, the same indeterminacy inherent in the residual 
clause was present in § 16(b).  Id.  “[B]ecause the two inquiries 
under the residual clause that the Supreme Court found to be 
indeterminate—the ordinary case inquiry and the serious 
potential risk inquiry—are materially the same as the inquiries 
under § 16(b),” we concluded that “§ 16(b) is 
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unconstitutionally vague.”  Id. at 621.  This conclusion applies 
equally to Mateo’s petition.   
Our treatment of § 16(b) is in step with the Sixth, Ninth, 
and Eleventh Circuits, which have all similarly deemed the 
provision to be void for vagueness in immigration cases.  See 
Shuti, 828 F.3d at 451; Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1120; Golicov v. 
Lynch, 837 F.3d 1065, 1072 (10th Cir. 2016).  The Seventh 
Circuit has also taken this position in the criminal context.  See 
United States v. Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d 719, 723 (7th Cir. 2015).  
In fact, the only circuit that has broken stride is the Fifth 
Circuit.7  See United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 
670, 677 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc).  In the meantime, we await 
the Supreme Court’s decision in the appeal of Dimaya.   
                                              
7 We note that the Second, Sixth, Eighth, Eleventh, and 
D.C. Circuits have concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which 
contains language nearly identical to § 16(b), survives 
Johnson.  See United States v. Hill, 832 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 
2016); United States v. Taylor, 814 F.3d 340, 375–79 (6th Cir. 
2016); United States v. Prickett, 839 F.3d 697 (8th Cir. 2016); 
Ovalles v. United States, 861 F.3d 1257, 1267 (11th Cir. 2017); 
United States v. Eshetu, 863 F.3d 946, 961 (D.C. Cir. 2017).  
But, as the Sixth Circuit recognized in reconciling its holding 
in Shuti that § 16(b) is void with its earlier decision in Taylor, 
“[u]nlike the ACCA and INA, which require a categorical 
approach to stale predicate convictions, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) is 
a criminal offense that requires an ultimate determination of 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt—by a jury, in the same 
proceeding.”  Shuti, 828 F.3d at 449.  In short, reasonable 
minds can and do differ over how the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Johnson applies in different contexts. 
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IV. 
 For the reasons discussed herein, we will grant the 
Petition for Review, vacate the order of removal, and remand 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
